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KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON: IS THE RESPONSE TO CURB
THE EFFECT OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION GOING
TOO FAR?
Jonathan Michels ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

In June 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a
1
landmark eminent domain case, Kelo v. City of New London. In a 5-4
decision, the Court held that a development plan for the purpose of
economic rejuvenation of unblighted property was considered a
“public use” and therefore, a constitutional use of eminent domain
2
power under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The decision has prompted significant outcry and response from the federal
government, state legislatures, and grassroots campaigns by citizens
3
of a number of states. Citing the lack of federal constitutional protection of private property rights in the wake of the Kelo decision, the
response intends to restrict state and local government eminent domain power through federal legislation, state legislation, and court
4
challenges to Kelo-type takings. The swift, nationwide response has
5
been at the forefront of media attention. However, it is unclear
whether such immediate and broad remedies will excessively restrict
eminent domain powers. Will state governments act hastily in response to the Kelo decision and craft remedies so broad that they will
limit the ability of government to utilize eminent domain power for
necessary future projects that would pass pre-Kelo constitutional muster? Or will people be encouraged to challenge legitimate public use
takings by popular support, thereby increasing the likelihood of frivo∗

J.D. Candidate, 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S.B.A. (Finance
and Management), 2004, Georgetown University.
1
125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
2
Id. at 2668 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4).
3
See infra Part V.A-C.
4
See infra Part V.
5
Id.

527

MICHELSFINAL

528

1/12/2007 11:08:47 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:527

lous litigation? These are questions that may surface as state legislatures continue to consider restrictive eminent domain legislation.
These questions will also continue to be at the forefront of discussion
as long as groups rally to protect victims of condemnation proceedings through constitutional challenges. The ultimate question then
arises: will the efforts to limit Kelo’s impact result in unintended restraints on the legitimate power of government to take private land
for economic development?
This Comment begins with an examination in Part II of the
background on eminent domain power and the development of the
6
public use test. Part III continues with an explanation of the Kelo
conflict in New London, Connecticut and an analysis of the Supreme
7
Court’s reasoning in the decision. The Comment then assesses in
Part IV the potential dangers that may flow from the broad view of
8
eminent domain powers adopted by the Supreme Court. Part V informs the reader of the federal and state legislation, both proposed
9
and enacted, that attempts to respond to the Kelo decision. This section also examines post-Kelo constitutional challenges to Kelo-type tak10
ings. Further, Part VI addresses the numerous potential routes that
governments at any level can pursue in response to Kelo, with an examination of the potential advantages and disadvantages of each
11
form of action. This Comment recommends a more cautious, restricted governmental response to Kelo rather than extensive legislation. The author concludes, in Part VII, that a moratorium on Kelotype takings to allow time for the federal and state legislatures to address the true impact of the Kelo decision is the most prudent course
of action as opposed to any hastily enacted legislation that may prove
too restrictive on the eminent domain power in the future.
II. BACKGROUND ON EMINENT DOMAIN POWER AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE TEST
The power of the Government to take private property is asserted in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and
12
has long been recognized as an inherent power of the sovereign.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states “nor shall private
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
Id.
See infra Part VI.
U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
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property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” This
restriction on the federal government found in the Fifth Amendment
14
is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Litigation over governmental takings has encompassed a breadth of
issues, from defining “public use” in an explicit taking to ascertaining
15
whether government regulation has constituted a regulatory taking.
Whether an explicit governmental taking is for a “public use” has
been an aspect of the takings doctrine that has developed and
16
changed significantly over the course of history through litigation.
The Takings Clause has been often litigated in state courts because of
its application to the states through incorporation by the Fourteenth
17
Amendment. Courts have applied a deferential rational basis standard of review when deciding whether a governmental takings satisfies a public use, similar to that used when analyzing the constitution18
ality of state action under the police power.
The most restrictive reading of the Takings Clause would suggest, as some early state courts held, that the “public use” could be
satisfied only if the property subject to the governmental taking was
19
actually used by the general public. The Supreme Court departed
from this restrictive view early in its jurisprudence, and instead
20
adopted a broader public purpose test.
The public purpose test is

13

Id.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
Selective Bill of Rights provisions, including the Fifth Amendment, are part of the
liberty protected from state interference by the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (1968).
15
See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–35 (1978)
(applying a balancing test to determine whether a regulatory taking had occurred
which would require the city to pay just compensation); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that if a property is deprived
of all value by a regulation, then this is a total taking requiring just compensation);
Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
342 (2002) (holding that a temporary moratorium is not a per se taking and rejecting the idea of conceptually severing the part of the property, either physically or
temporally, from the whole). This Comment focuses on the limited question of
whether an explicit taking for economic development satisfies a public use. See infra
Parts III.-VII.
16
See infra notes 19–74 and accompanying text.
17
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S. at 241.
18
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
19
See Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 338–39 (Mich. 1887); Gaylord v. Sanitary
Dist. of Chi., 68 N.E. 522, 524–25 (Ill. 1903); Jacobs v. Clearview Water Supply Co., 69
A. 870, 872 (Pa. 1908).
20
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 159–61 (1896) (holding that
taking for the purpose of constructing an irrigation ditch was a public purpose and
in the public interest, and therefore constitutional).
14
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satisfied by a government taking in which the government maintains
ownership of the land and utilizes it to promote the general public
21
welfare, such as building a highway or a military base. The highway
would have satisfied the most restrictive interpretation of the public
purpose test, but the military base only passes constitutional muster
22
under the broader public purpose test. This is because the highway
is available for use by the general public, passing even the strictest interpretation, while the military base is not accessible by the general
public but exists for a public purpose, failing the strictest interpreta23
tion but passing a broader view of the test.
The public purpose test is further complicated, however, when
the subsequent owner of the private property taken by the govern24
ment is another private party. In the landmark case of Berman v.
25
Parker, the Supreme Court held that an economic redevelopment
plan enacted to cure a blighted neighborhood in Washington, D.C.
by selling or leasing the condemned land to a private redevelopment
company was constitutional even though a piece of commercial
26
property subject to condemnation was not itself blighted. Congress
passed the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act (“Act”) in 1945
in an effort to eliminate and prevent slum and substandard housing
27
conditions within the city. The Act was specifically enacted as a result of a determination that “conditions existing in the District of Columbia with respect to substandard housing and blighted areas . . .
28
are injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.” Congress further found that in order to eliminate these housing conditions, it would be necessary to acquire all of the property in the
29
In order to achieve the stated goals, Congress determined
area.
that a comprehensive and cohesive plan of redevelopment would be
necessary to eliminate the substandard conditions, as opposed to
30
leaving the changes to piecemeal private or public development.

21

Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925); Rindge Co. v.
County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 708 (1923).
22
Old Dominion Land Co., 269 U.S. at 66; Rindge Co., 262 U.S. at 706.
23
Old Dominion Land Co., 269 U.S. at 66–67; Rindge Co., 262 U.S. at 706.
24
See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229 (1984); see also infra notes 18–52 and accompanying text.
25
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
26
Id. at 35–36.
27
Id. at 28.
28
Id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-701 (LexisNexis 1951), repealed by D.C. CODE
ANN. § 6-301.02(4) (LexisNexis 2006)).
29
Id.
30
Id. at 29.
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Further, pursuant to the Act, Congress created the National Capital
Planning Commission (“Commission”), and entrusted the Commission with the power of eminent domain to acquire the necessary
property to achieve the comprehensive redevelopment and eliminate
31
the blighted neighborhoods. The Commission was entitled to lease
or sell the acquired land to private redevelopment companies, individuals, or partnerships so long as the party would carry out the rede32
velopment plan.
Under the power given by the Act, the Commission developed a
comprehensive plan of redevelopment for an area of D.C. which,
through extensive findings, the Commission determined to be
33
blighted and beyond repair. The Plaintiffs challenged the taking as
unconstitutional because their property, a commercial department
34
Even so, their
store, was not slum housing targeted by the Act.
property was subject to the redevelopment plan and was to be trans35
ferred to private ownership. The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint seeking to
36
enjoin the condemnation and held the Act constitutional.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the taking
37
authorized by the Act met the requirement of a “public use.” It first
found that Congress had police power authority over the District of
38
Columbia just as a state would have over its affairs. To determine
whether the redevelopment plan was a “public use” for purposes of
the eminent domain power, the Court approached the question from
39
the perspective of Congress’ broad police powers.

31

Berman, 348 U.S. at 29.
Id. at 30.
33
Id. The findings included statistics that 64.3% of the dwellings were beyond
repair, 57.8% of the dwellings had outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 29.3% lacked
electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs, and 83.8% lacked central heating. Id.
34
Id. at 31.
35
Id.
36
Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 724–26 (D.D.C. 1953).
37
Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-34.
38
Id. at 31–32.
39
Id. at 32. As the Court asserts:
We deal . . . with what traditionally has been known as the police
power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically
capable of complete definition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
32
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The Court understood Congress’ powers to promote the public
40
welfare to be very broad. When determining what is in the public
welfare, the Court noted that the public welfare is “spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary . . . beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully pa41
trolled.” The Court determined that a congressional finding of substandard housing conditions and blighted neighborhoods where
crime and immorality flourish and sanity and cleanliness are lacking
42
can justify using the police power to correct such problems. However, once a determination is made that the pursued end is legitimate, the means to achieve the end, even use of eminent domain, is
43
The Court stated that solely bewithin congressional discretion.
cause the ultimate owner of the property may be a private party does
44
not make the Act unconstitutional. The Court further explained
that “[t]he public end may be as well or better served through an
agency of private enterprise than through a department of govern45
ment.” Congress is not required to address a problem one building
at a time, but instead can focus on the area as a whole when deter46
mining an appropriate course of action and plan. Therefore, the
Court concluded that the comprehensive redevelopment plan to
eliminate substandard housing and blight in the city that required a
balanced and integrated plan to achieve the goal, thus including ap47
pellants’ property not itself blighted, was constitutional. Further,
the Court concluded that Congress established adequate standards to
48
eliminate slums and the blighted areas that may produce slums.
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court further declared its deference to legislative judgments regarding the public purpose determination where the subsequent owner would be a private party in Ha49
The Hawaii Legislature enacted
waii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.
50
the Land Reform Act of 1967, which provided for the condemnadeclared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases, the legislature,
not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs . . . .
Id.
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 33.
Id.
Berman, 347 U.S. at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 33–34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 34–35.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 35.
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 516-1, et seq. (1967).
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tion of private land held in oligopoly by a few private owners. Prior
to 1967, much of the privately owned land in Hawaii, due to a system
of land transfers dating from the islands’ settlement, was held in the
52
hands of elite private landowners. Finding that this concentrated
land ownership harmed the residential housing market, caused infla53
tion of land prices, and injured the public welfare, and with the private landowners unwilling to sell any of their property, the legislature
passed the Land Reform Act. The Act gave authority to the Hawaii
Housing Authority to condemn the private land and transfer the land
54
to the private party who had previously been leasing such land. The
Hawaii Legislature believed that the condemnation would promote
the purpose of redistributing land while ameliorating the harsh tax
consequences to the transferor land owners, presumably the primary
55
reason for resistance to sale in the first place. The transferee private
parties would receive the land in fee simple if these parties made a
showing that the condemnation would “effectuate the public purposes of the Act” and just compensation was paid to the transferor
56
land owner. The constitutionality of the Act was challenged as a violation of the Fifth Amendment by a private landowner who would not
acquiesce to compulsory arbitration to determine just compensa57
tion. Initially, the District Court of Hawaii’s opinion was that the
58
Land Reform Act was constitutional. However, on review, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the Land Reform Act unconstitutional because it did nothing but change the ownership of land
59
from one private party to another.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, held that a condemnation of private property by the
state legislature of Hawaii in an effort to divide a land oligopoly
60
amongst greater number of owners was constitutional. After a dis61
cussion of Berman v. Parker, the majority reiterated its holding that
51

Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233.
Id. at 232. The state and federal governments owned almost forty-nine percent
of the state’s land and another forty-seven percent was in the hands of only seventytwo private landowners. Id. Further, of this forty-seven percent owned privately,
forty percent was owned by only eighteen landowners. Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 233.
55
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233.
56
Id. at 233 (internal citations omitted).
57
Id. at 234–35.
58
Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62, 69–70 (D. Haw. 1979).
59
Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983).
60
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984).
61
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
52
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“[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of
62
a sovereign’s police powers.” The majority explained that decisions
of the legislature, even those involving the eminent domain power,
shall be granted judicial deference, and the Court will “not substitute
its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes a pub63
lic use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.’”
The Court noted that “where the exercise of the eminent domain
power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court
has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public
64
Use Clause.” The majority held that the Hawaii Act was constitutional as a valid exercise of the State eminent domain power to break
up the land oligopoly and eliminate the evils which followed from
such a situation because the methods used by the legislature and the
procedures employed were a “comprehensive and rational approach
65
to identifying and correcting market failure.” The use of the eminent domain power was a rational approach to serve a legitimate legislative purpose regardless of the fact that the property was trans66
The Court made clear that a
ferred to another private owner.
taking “executed for no reason other than to confer a private benefit
67
on a particular private party” would be unconstitutional. However,
the Hawaii Act did not confer such a private benefit, but instead attacked the evil of concentrated property ownership, which was a le68
gitimate public purpose.
Inevitably, with such a broad interpretation of public use, state
governments began to utilize their power under eminent domain for
economic redevelopment projects that were not intended to cure
69
blight, but solely to provide an economic boost. In 1981, for example, the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld a statute which allowed
for condemnation of private land to “alleviate and prevent conditions
of unemployment and to preserve and develop industry and com70
merce.” The statute’s purpose was to condemn private property in
62

Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680
(1896)) (internal citations omitted).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 242.
66
Id. at 243.
67
Id. at 245.
68
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
69
See, e.g., Michigan Economic Development Corporations Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 125.1622 (1981).
70
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458
(Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.
2004).
63
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order to build a General Motors assembly plant. The General Motors plant did not come close to living up to its expected revenue and
job creation, and “[i]n all likelihood, it destroyed more jobs than it
72
created.” Subsequently, however, in 2004, the Supreme Court of
Michigan overruled its own earlier holding, and held that a generalized economic benefit to the community that is the product of a pri73
vate entity’s profit maximization is not a public use. The Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari in Kelo to clarify the law
74
in this area in its 2004 term.
III.

WHAT HAPPENED IN NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT?

A. Susette Kelo and the Victims of the Condemnation
Susette Kelo and her neighbors made their homes, some over a
century old, in New London, Connecticut, which they enjoyed for its
75
waterfront location since the early 1900s. Some moved in more recently, but have nonetheless taken great care to improve and main76
tain their private residences. Still others were owners of investment
77
properties in the area. They all came together to challenge a city
council that made it quite clear that it would prefer revenue generating redeveloped real estate in the city instead of private homeown78
ers. In total, nine people owned fifteen properties in the area that
79
was the subject of this heated litigation. None of the property in
question was kept in disrepair or blighted condition so as to require
80
redevelopment.
These people were not holding out for more
money; they were fighting for their right to stay in their homes with
81
their families.
71

Id. at 457.
Institute for Justice, Landmark Eminent Domain Abuse Decision, IJ.com (July 31,
2004), http://www.ij.org/private_property/michigan/7_31_04pr.html.
73
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787.
74
Kelo v. City of New London, 542 U.S. 965 (2004).
75
Petitioner, Wilhelmina Dery, has been in her home in New London since 1918,
and her husband has lived in the house for nearly sixty years, since they married.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005). The house has been in
the family for over 100 years, and her son lives next door. Id. at 2671. (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
76
Susette Kelo has lived in her home since 1997 and has made substantial improvements to the home since she moved in. Id. at 2660.
77
Petitioners live in ten of the properties and five are investment properties. Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
81
Id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
72
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B. You’re in the Way, So the Government Will Force You Out
The City of New London became a target for economic redevelopment in 1998 after years of economic decline and increased un82
employment levels. In an effort to plan a cohesive redevelopment
of the city, a private nonprofit organization, the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), reemerged after years of being inac83
Only a month after a planning budget was created for the
tive.
84
NLDC, Pfizer announced the construction of a $300 million re85
search facility next to the proposed redevelopment area. In an attempt to capitalize on the industry moving into the area, the NLDC
planned and submitted redevelopment plans to state agencies, which
86
approved these schemes. The development plans included areas for
a hotel, restaurants, shopping, marinas, new residences, research and
development office space, and “park support” (parking or retail ser87
vice for the state park). In order to effectuate the plan, the city
council authorized the NLDC to purchase property or to acquire
88
property by exercising eminent domain in the city’s name.
The
plan was intended to create jobs, generate tax revenue, help revitalize
downtown New London, beautify the city, and make the waterfront
89
and park leisure and recreational destinations. The NLDC, during
litigation, declared they would lease some of the land to private de90
velopers should the developers go along with the plan.
C. The Fight Moves to the Courts
Nine victims of the condemnation filed suit against the city
council and the NLDC in New London Superior Court asserting that
the taking of their land could not be considered a “public use” as re91
quired by the Fifth Amendment. The Superior Court granted an

82

Id. at 2658–59.
Id. at 2659.
84
The State authorized a $5.35 million bond issue for planning activities and a
$10 million bond issue for a state park. Id.
85
Id.
86
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
87
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 509–10 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S.
Ct. 2655 (2005) (specifically describing the property to be developed and the
planned development).
88
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659–60.
89
Id. at 2659.
90
Id. at 2660 n.4.
91
Kelo v. City of New London, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
83
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injunction prohibiting the taking of property for the park or marina
92
support. However, the court also held that the property scheduled
to be used as office space could be condemned for the redevelop93
ment.
Because of the divided judgment by the New London Superior
Court, allowing eminent domain for some of the property and grant94
ing an injunction for other parts, the landowners and the city coun95
cil both appealed the decision. The Supreme Court of Connecticut,
96
pursuant to statute, transferred the appeal from the Appellate Divi97
sion. In a comprehensive opinion analyzing each parcel of redevelopment, the Supreme Court of Connecticut found the entire redevelopment program constitutional, thereby affirming in part and
98
The court
reversing in part the judgment of the superior court.
held that the city council’s proposed takings were all valid because
the taking of land as part of economic development project furthers
99
the public interest and thus satisfies the public use requirement.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut specifically held that the municipal economic development was a constitutionally valid public use
considering that the intended use of land was sufficiently definite and
had been given “reasonable attention” during the planning process,
which was significant to ensure that the plan was being enacted with
100
the public interest as the primary objective.
It was in this decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut that
101
the first judicial voices of dissent were heard.
Three of the seven
justices, dissenting, did not believe that the takings at issue in New
London were for a valid public use and further believed that there
should be a heightened standard of review for takings for economic
102
redevelopment. In order for an economic development plan to be
a valid public use, according to the dissent, clear and convincing evidence needs to be presented that the benefits of the development
92

Id. at *341.
Id.
94
Id.
95
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507– 08 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S.
Ct. 2655 (2005).
96
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-199(c) (2005).
97
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 508 n.3 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S.
Ct. 2655 (2005).
98
Id. at 574.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 573–74.
101
Id. at 574 (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Sullivan and Justice Katz joined in Justice Zarella’s opinion. Id.
102
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 587 (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93
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plan would be realized by the city, an idea rejected by the majority
103
because of administrative infeasibility.
104
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari,
and, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of
Connecticut that a development plan for unblighted property for a
purpose of economic rejuvenation was a public use, and therefore, a
valid use of eminent domain power consistent with the Takings
105
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
106
Breyer joined.
The Kelo majority opinion explained that a city could not take
107
private land to confer a private benefit on a particular private party,
nor could it use the pretext of public use to bestow a private bene108
fit.
The Court distinguished such scenarios by recognizing, as the
Connecticut Supreme Court did, that in New London there was a
comprehensive development plan with no illegitimate purpose—the
plan was carefully designed to pursue the public welfare goals of the
legislature with no evidence that it was favoring a particular private
109
This fact, according to the majority, was sufficient to
beneficiary.
establish that a particular private party was not benefited by the
110
plan.
Justice Stevens recognized that, although the land would not be
open to the general public, such a requirement has long been aban111
doned by Supreme Court precedent. According to such precedent,
the Justice explained that the public use language in the Fifth
Amendment should be interpreted broadly to mean a public pur112
The majority opinion noted the policy of deference to legispose.
lative judgments when determining the constitutionality of a tak113
ing. Such deference, the majority explained, “afford[s] legislatures

103

Id. at 588 (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 500, cert. granted, 542 U.S. 965 (2004).
105
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005).
106
Id. at 2657.
107
Id. at 2661 (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
108
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
109
Id.; Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 595 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S.
Ct. 2655 (2005) (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662.
111
Id. (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 244).
112
Id. at 2662–63.
113
Id. at 2663–64 (discussing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) and Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
104
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broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the
114
takings power.”
115
The Court, citing Berman v. Parker, stated that judicial deference shall be afforded to the legislature, and approved of the legislature’s goals to make the community “beautiful as well as healthy, spa116
cious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”
Even though the redevelopment program in Berman was targeted at
117
rejuvenating a blighted neighborhood, the Kelo majority found the
Berman redevelopment plan to have encompassed much more than
118
just correcting blight.
In making this determination, Justice Stevens analogized the Berman plan to the redevelopment plan in New
119
London.
Although the area in New London was admittedly not
blighted, the majority opinion deferred to the city council’s judgment
that the unemployment rate and the economic decline in the city
were enough to necessitate the economic rejuvenation plan which
120
satisfied the public purpose requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
In ultimately deciding that this plan served a public purpose, Justice
Stevens pointed to the new jobs and increased tax revenue that were
expected to result from the plan, which would be to the benefit of
121
the general public.
Justice Stevens proceeded to reject two rules proposed by the
122
The Justice first refused to adopt a
landowners in New London.
123
bright line rule that economic development is not a public use.
Pointing to the broad view of public purpose, the deference to legislative judgment, and the role of government in promoting economic
124
development, the majority found no reason to adopt such a rule.
The majority also rejected a proposed rule that the expected public
benefits, like tax revenues and more jobs, must be found with “rea125
sonable certainty” before the redevelopment project could begin.
The Court believed this requirement would significantly hinder al-

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id. at 2664.
See supra notes 24–48 and accompanying text.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 33).
See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663–64.
Id. at 2665.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2665–66.
Id.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665–66.
Id. at 2667–68.
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126

most any redevelopment plan.
In addressing the fact that private
parties will benefit from the redevelopment because they may be involved in the construction or other aspects of the implementation,
the majority disagreed, noting that private parties often benefit from
127
takings done for a public purpose. The majority opinion, however,
avoided the question of constitutionality of such transfers occurring
outside the scope of a comprehensive plan because this was not at is128
sue in the case.
Justice Kennedy, who also joined the opinion of the Court, wrote
a concurrence in which he expressed some hesitation and concern
over the validity of the taking of land from one private party and
129
transferring it to a different private party. The concurring opinion
affirmed the rational basis test as the appropriate review of governmental takings, but urged that the deferential review should not prevent the Court from striking down takings “intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public
130
Justice Kennedy advocated a more stringent rational babenefits.”
sis review by the courts when an economic development taking may
favor a private party, specifically stating that “the objection [should
be treated] as a serious one and [the court should] review the record
to see if it has merit, though with the presumption that the government’s actions were reasonable and intended to serve a public pur131
The concurring opinion found that the economic redevelpose.”
opment plan in New London was for a valid public purpose because
it was clearly established that the plan was carefully designed to provide for economic revitalization and was not intended to specifically
132
benefit any private party.
In foresight, Justice Kennedy noted that
takings where the ultimate recipient will be a private party may require a “more stringent standard of review” if there is suspicion of
other motives behind the “public purpose,” but foreclosed the idea of
133
a presumption of invalidity for economic redevelopment takings.

126

Id. at 2668.
Id. at 2666 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1954) (“The public
end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than
through a department of government—or so the Congress might conclude. We
cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.”)).
128
Id. at 2667.
129
Id. at 2669–70 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132
Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127
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D. The Dissenting Voices in Support of Private Property Rights
Justice O’Connor wrote a strong dissenting opinion, which was
134
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
In possibly one of the most cited lines of the entire decision, Justice
O’Connor stated that due to the majority’s opinion, “[t]he specter of
135
Justice O’Connor urged
condemnation hangs over all property.”
the Court to realize that allowing economic development to constitute a valid public purpose puts all private property at risk if it can be
136
According to Justice
put to a more beneficial use by the public.
O’Connor, private property takings for economic development resulting in incidental public benefits eliminate the distinction between
private and public use of property and “thereby effectively . . . delete
the words ‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
137
Amendment.”
In elaborating the Court’s role in takings for economic development, O’Connor stated that there must be judicial checks to pro138
tect property rights, security of property, and fairness.
The Justice
noted that regardless of judicial deference to legislatures, “[a]n external, judicial check on how the public use requirement is interpreted, however limited, is necessary if this constraint on government
139
power is to retain any meaning.”
Justice O’Connor differentiated Berman and Midkiff, cases heavily
140
While private property was taken for
relied upon by the majority.
private use in each of those cases, Justice O’Connor distinguished
them by pointing to the specific harm that each legislature addressed
by condemning the property, as opposed to a vague concept of eco141
nomic stimulation.
The Justice noted that, under those circumstances, the public purpose was directly realized by the elimination of
142
According to O’Connor, this was dramatically different
the harm.
134

Id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia,
and Justice Thomas joined the dissent.
135
Id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
136
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
137
Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
138
Id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
139
Id. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
140
See supra text accompanying notes 115–121.
141
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673–74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that the taking for private use was for the purpose of curing blight and slums from a D.C. neighborhood); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that the taking for private use was to break up
the oligopolistic land control structure in Hawaii)).
142
Id. at 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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from a holding that “the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary
private use, so long as the new use is predicated to generate some
secondary benefit for the public—such as increased tax revenue,
143
Regardless of the fact
more jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure.”
that there was a comprehensive plan in New London, according to
O’Connor, nothing prevents a plan that is less cohesive, less thorough, or more speculative from passing this broadened public pur144
Justice O’Connor concluded by warning that the deferpose test.
ential review posited by the majority will benefit “those citizens with
disproportionate influence and power in the political process, includ145
ing large corporations and development firms,” and harm “those
146
with fewer resources.”
Justice Thomas, although joining in Justice O’Connor’s dissent,
147
also wrote a dissenting opinion of his own. Justice Thomas believed
that by affirming that a “vague promise of new jobs and increased tax
revenues” satisfies a public purpose for a redevelopment plan that “is
also suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer Corporation,” the Court has
essentially allowed for any taking to be considered “for a ‘public
148
use.’” Justice Thomas rejected the idea that any economic redevelopment plan could be a public use by explaining that there was no
basis in the original understanding of the Fifth Amendment for it to
be construed to mean anything other than “authoriz[ing] takings for
public use only if the government or the public actually uses the
149
taken property.”
The Justice believed that expanding the “public
use” test to become a broad public purpose test and giving significant
deference to the legislature in determining that broad public pur150
pose were both products of misguided jurisprudence. According to
Justice Thomas, “[n]o compensation is possible for the subjective
value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indignity in151
Further, due to beflicted by uprooting them from their homes.”
ing the most frequently targeted places for economic redevelopment,
152
“these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities.”
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2676–77 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2677–78 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2682 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2683–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2686–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

MICHELSFINAL

2007]

1/12/2007 11:08:47 AM

COMMENT

543

The Justice would therefore hold the takings at issue as unconstitu153
tional in violation of the Public Use Clause.
IV.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH SUCH A BROAD VIEW
OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN POWER?

The Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo, embodying a broad view
of eminent domain power and allowing governmental takings of land
for private use for purposes of economic redevelopment, is unsettling
to the nation as a whole for a number of reasons. All property is potentially at risk. If a public benefit can be gleaned by increased tax
revenue or more jobs, then how is it ever possible that a taking of
residential property for the purpose of putting in commercial development would not be for a public use? Further, given a standard of
only deferential rational basis review, it is difficult to determine how
potential takings motivated to benefit private parties can be properly
scrutinized. Justice Kennedy, in concurrence, urged “meaningful ra154
tional basis review,” but how this should be applied is a mystery.
Under rational basis review, underhanded motives or particular
benefits to private parties becomes a “test of whether the legislature
155
As it is likely that any and every economic dehas a stupid staff.”
velopment taking will be cast in the light of increased tax revenues
and higher employment rates, without more intense scrutiny, no
court will be able to ascertain underlying motives when politicallyconnected, private corporations receive land from poor landowners
156
who have no choice but to acquiesce.
Further, the public/private
distinction after Kelo becomes so merged that it emasculates any
157
meaning from the public use test, and as Justice O’Connor pointed
out in dissent, this is the trouble with economic development takings
158
While
where private benefit and incidental public benefit co-exist.
both the majority and dissent recognized that a private taking for the
159
particular benefit of another private party was unconstitutional,
with rational basis review and presumption of validity of the taking, it
appears disconcertingly easy for the legislature to cover up true motives under a pretext of “tax gains” or “more jobs” or “generalized
economic resurgence.”
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2687 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992).
See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 107-08, 130, 136–37, 149 and accompanying text.
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Even though concern over the potential implications of Kelo may
be justified in light of the broad eminent domain power described by
the majority of the Court, it is still wise and cautious to avoid any excessive reaction, whether intentional or unintentional. As opposed to
succumbing to influence caused by the haste and alarm following the
decision, legislatures at the federal and state level should take time to
properly analyze the true, practical implications of the decisions, thus
avoiding overbroad legislation that may inadvertently constrain even
broadly acceptable eminent domain programs. In order to prudently
go about such a process, it would be advisable for the legislature to
enact a moratorium on takings of private land in which the subsequent owner or occupier will also be a private party, establish a committee to determine proper legislative response, and draft such legislation so as to ensure that its scope is appropriately limited. This
Comment discusses the recommended response in more detail in
Part VI.
V. WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT KELO?
A. Federal Action in the House and Senate
Congress has moved quickly to propose and pass legislation to
limit the effect of the Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New
160
London.
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have
proposed legislation that would limit Kelo by withholding federal
161
funds for economic redevelopment projects.
The federal government has the power to pass such legislation through the use of
162
Spending Clause of the Constitution.
On November 30, 2005, President Bush signed into law the first
163
The enfederal legislation aimed at curbing the effects of Kelo.
acted law is an amendment to a Treasury, Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development Appropriations bill barring federal
transportation funds from being used in projects that take private
160

125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
See infra text accompanying notes 163–79.
162
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States.”); see Transportation, Treasury, Housing and
Urban Development, The Judiciary, The District of Columbia, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act [hereinafter “Act”], Pub. L. No. 109-115, 119 Stat. 2396
(2005) (Congressional Appropriations Bill expressly utilizing spending clause
power).
163
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. at 2494–2495.
161
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property for economic redevelopment that primarily benefit private
164
This legislation was introduced in the House and passed
entities.
165
The
in the Senate before being signed into law by the president.
bill enumerates specified projects that would be considered for a
public use, including mass transit, railroad, and other commonly ac166
Further, the bill enumerates as a public use
cepted public uses.
“projects for the removal of an immediate threat to public health and
safety or Brownfields as defined in the Small Business Liability Relief
167
and Brownfields Revitalization Act.”
The language of the enacted legislation resembles a proposed
Senate bill entitled “Protection of Homes, Small Businesses, and Pri168
vate Property Act of 2005.”
The proposed legislation states that
eminent domain power is only for public use but further provides
that “the term ‘public use’ shall not be construed to include eco169
The bill is an express limitation on the fednomic development.”
eral government, but also applies to state and local government by re170
stricting the use of federal funds for such projects. More recently, a
bill entitled “Empowering More Property Owners With Enhanced
Rights Act of 2005” (EMPOWER Act) has been proposed in the Sen171
This bill would enhance the rights of, and provide advocates
ate.
for, private property and small business owners affected by federal
172
use of the eminent domain power.
The House of Representatives has also passed a resolution subsequent to the Supreme Court decision stating its “grave disapproval
of . . . the majority opinion of the Supreme Court . . . that nullifies
the protections afforded private property owners in the Takings
173
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”
The resolution states that the
Supreme Court opinion justifies eminent domain takings “for the
164
165

Id.
H.R. 3058, 109th Cong. (2005) (passed on June 30, 2005 by a vote of 231 to

189).
166

Act, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. at 2495.
Id. The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act is
primarily an environmental act passed to provide relief to small businesses from liability under CERCLA and to promote cleanup and reuse of Brownfields and assisted
state response for environmental clean up. Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
168
S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005).
169
Id. at § 3.
170
Id. The States would still have the ability to utilize state funds to pursue these
projects, if they so choose, as this is not regulated by the bill. Id.
171
S. 1883, 109th Cong. (2005).
172
Id.
173
H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005) (agreed to by a vote of 365 to 33).
167
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174

sole benefit of another private person.”
The House also has proposed legislation similar to that in the Senate defining “public use” to
175
Similarly,
specifically not include economic development projects.
the proposed legislation expressly limits the federal government and
176
limits state and local government through the use of federal funds.
Other means proposed by representatives in the House to limit private property takings for economic redevelopment are to “withhold
community development block grant funds from States and commu177
nities,” to limit federal funds for economic development should the
government not pay the relocation costs for people whose land is
178
taken for such projects, and to amend the Constitution of the
179
United States.
Congress needs to be cautious in passing legislation that may
prove to be too constricting on necessary eminent domain power.
Much of the proposed legislation is too far reaching, namely those
proposed bills that merely say that “economic development never satisfies a public use” and therefore does not support the use of eminent
180
domain power. Further, the House Resolution misstates the majority holding in Kelo when it states that the opinion endorses private
181
This type of
takings for the sole benefit of another private party.
resolution is misleading and could lead to legislation that is far more
drastic than necessary. Also, the enacted legislation could prove too
far-reaching and over-inclusive. Even though the drafters were careful to carve out specific enumerated uses that would support the use
of eminent domain, there is little exception in the Act when it comes
to economic development, which may be necessary under certain circumstances, evidenced by the grave need for economic redevelopment in blighted neighborhoods which cannot effectively be cured
without comprehensive action through government.

174

Id.
H.R. 3083, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3135,
109th Cong. (2005).
176
H.R. 3083, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3135,
109th Cong. (2005).
177
H.R. 3315, 109th Cong. (2005).
178
H.R. 3405, 109th Cong. (2005).
179
H.R.J. Res. 60, 109th Cong. (2005) (amendment to read that “[n]either a State
nor the United States may take private property for the purpose of transferring possession of, or control over, that property to another private person, except for a public conveyance or transportation project”).
180
See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
181
See supra note 173–74 and accompanying text.
175
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B. State Action
In the majority opinion in Kelo, Justice Stevens emphasized “that
nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further re182
strictions on its exercise of the takings power.”
Justice Stevens
commented that the public use test articulated by the Supreme Court
is just the “federal baseline,” and that States may impose stricter re183
quirements for takings, and, in fact, some already do.
Since the Kelo decision, legislation has been enacted in twentyfour states and proposed in nearly every other state to limit the effect
184
of the decision on state and local decision makers.
The legislation
attempts to use different tools and strict definitions to limit the broad
eminent domain power announced by the Supreme Court in the decision.
The first state to pass legislation subsequent to Kelo was Dela185
ware.
In the act, amending the Delaware Code, the legislature
mandates that governmental takings must be for a “recognized public
use as described at least six months in advance of condemnation proceedings: (i) in a certified planning document, (ii) at a public hearing held specifically to address the acquisition, or (iii) in a published
186
The market value of the conreport of the acquiring agency.”
demned property is established by an independent and impartial ap187
praiser.
Further, the Delaware Legislature specifies that it is the
courts, as opposed to the acquiring agency, that determines compensation to the private party for “reasonable attorney, appraisal and en188
gineering fees.”
Following closely behind Delaware, the Alabama Legislature
passed legislation limiting state and local exercise of eminent domain
189
power in light of Kelo.
The Alabama Legislature passed the bill to
restrict private property takings for the benefit of another private
190
party.
In specifically enumerating the circumstances where private
takings would be restricted, the statute directs that “a municipality or
county may not condemn property for the purposes of private retail,
182

Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005).
Id.
184
See infra notes 185–241 and accompanying text.
185
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9505(15) (2005).
186
Id.
187
Id. at § 9505(11).
188
Id. at § 9503.
189
ALA. CODE §§ 11-47-170, 11-80-1 (2005) (amended by 2005-313 Ala. Adv. Legis.
Serv. § 1 (LexisNexis)).
190
2005-313 Ala. Adv. Legis. Serv. § 1 (LexisNexis).
183

MICHELSFINAL

548

1/12/2007 11:08:47 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:527

office, commercial, industrial, or residential development; or primarily for enhancement of tax revenue; or for transfer to a person, nongovernmental entity, public-private partnership, corporation, or
191
The legislature specifically exempted from
other business entity.”
the amendment any takings intended to cure an already blighted
192
Further, the legislature provided for condemned property,
area.
should it cease being used for the purpose for which it was condemned or for some other public use, to be first offered for sale back
to the original owner at the same price as was received by the owner
193
at the time of condemnation.
The Texas Legislature also passed a bill amending its Government Code to limit the use of eminent domain for private parties or
194
economic development purposes.
The bill declares that any party
that is entrusted with the power of eminent domain is prohibited
from taking private property if a particular private party is benefited
through the use of the property or if the stated public use is “merely a
195
pretext to confer a private benefit on a particular private party.”
Further, the amendment prohibits private takings “for economic development purposes, unless . . . [the purpose is] to eliminate an exist196
The
ing affirmative harm on society from slum or blighted areas.”
Texas amendment specifically enumerates uses for which an entity
can use eminent domain to seize property, including transportation
projects, water supply, hospitals, utility services, sports venue, waste
disposal, and other commonly accepted uses of eminent domain
197
power.
Further, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 refer to specific uses of
198
eminent domain power for collection of information, state high199
200
ways, Trans-Texas corridor and environmental needs, institutes of
201
202
higher education, and charitable corporations, respectively.

191

ALA CODE § 11-47-170 (2005).
Id.
193
Id. § 11-47-170(c).
194
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.0001 (Vernon 2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
502.0037 (Vernon 2005); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 203.052 (Vernon 2005); TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 227.041 (Vernon 2005); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.9045
(Vernon 2005).
195
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b)(1) (Vernon 2005).
196
Id. § 2206.001 (b)(3).
197
Id. § 2206.001 (c).
198
Id. § 552.0037.
199
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 203.052 (Vernon 2005).
200
Id. § 227.041.
201
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.9045 (Vernon 2005).
202
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3183b-1, § 6 (Vernon 2005).
192
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Following close behind these three states which were quick to
act, many other states have subsequently enacted legislation to significantly limit the eminent domain power of state and local government as well as any agency or entity which possesses such power.
203
204
205
206
207
208
Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indi209
210
211
212
213
214
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minne215
216
217
218
219
sota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsyl203

H.B. 319, 2006 Leg., 24th Sess. (Alaska 2005) (restricting use of eminent domain power when transfer of land is to private party except in regards to oil and gas
development).
204
H.B. 06-1411, 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence of blight prior to condemnation of property).
205
H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg., 108th Sess. (Fla. 2006) (prohibiting taking of private
property to eliminate blight or public nuisances and prohibiting transfer of condemned private property to another private party for ten years following the taking).
206
H.B. 1313, 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006) (specifically defining blight
and prohibiting use of eminent domain for economic development except in the instance of curing blight).
207
H.B. 555, 2006 Leg., 58th Sess. (Idaho 2006) (restricting eminent domain for
transfers to private parties or for economic development while providing for judicial
review of eminent domain takings).
208
S.B. 3086, 94th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2005) (prohibiting use of eminent domain for
private development unless condemned property is in a blighted area).
209
H.B. 1010, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (redefining “public
use” and implementing provisions to ease private challenges to use of eminent domain power).
210
H.F. 2351, 81st Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2006) (restricting definition
of “public use” and shifting all expenses to the acquiring agency).
211
S.B. 323, 2006 Leg. (Kan. 2006) (clarifying need for “public use” before eminent domain power can be used and restricting transfers to a private party to situations involving the Department of Transportation or other expressly authorized
uses).
212
H.B. 508, 2006 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006) (enumerating permissible public
uses and eliminating the term “public purpose” from legislation).
213
S.B. 1, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006) (constitutional amendment specifically
defining public purposes and prohibiting condemnation of property for use by or
transfer to a private party).
214
L.D. 1870, 2005 Leg., 122nd, 2d Sess. (Me. 2005) (restricting condemnation of
property for private business or residential development, enhancement of tax revenue, or transfer to private party except when property is blighted).
215
H.F. 2846, 2006 Leg., 84th Sess. (Minn. 2006) (prohibiting takings for private
commercial development and defining “blight” to require an endangerment of public health and safety and prohibiting use of eminent domain for economic development and specifically defining public use).
216
H.B. 1944, 93d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006) (prohibiting use of eminent domain power for economic development and requiring a finding of blight before condemnation of private property unless there is another public use).
217
L.B. 924, 2006 Leg., 99th, 2d. Sess. (Neb. 2006) (prohibiting use of eminent
domain power for economic development, including increased tax revenue, employment, or economic resurgence except in conditions of blight).
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vania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Vir225
226
ginia, and Wisconsin have enacted legislation to limit the impact
227
228
229
230
California,
Connecticut,
Massachusetts,
of Kelo. Arizona,

218

S.B. 287, 159th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2006) (eliminating “areas in the
process of becoming blighted” from scope of eminent domain power and changing
“public purpose” to “public use”).
219
S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006) (imposing moratorium on
use of eminent domain power to condemn unblighted private property and transfer
property to another private party for economic development until December 31,
2006).
220
S.B. 881, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006) (prohibiting use of eminent
domain power to take private property for private commercial development except
for blighted areas in enumerated locations).
221
H.B. 1080, 2006 Leg. (S.D. 2006) (restricting use of eminent domain power to
transfer property to private owner or non-governmental entity or for enhancement
of tax revenue).
222
S.B. 3296, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006) (specifically defining
what constitutes a public use for condemnation of private property and removing the
right of eminent domain from certain enumerated entities).
223
S.B. 117, 2006 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2006) (requiring legislative approval after
public hearing of the condemnation with the property owners having the right to be
heard on the proposal).
224
S. 0246, 2005–2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2006) (prohibiting use of eminent domain to confer private benefit on particular private party and restricting use
of eminent domain for economic development).
225
H.B. 4048, 77th Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 2006) (restricting use of eminent domain power for economic development except in limited circumstances to cure
blight).
226
Assemb. B. 657, 2005–2006 Leg. (Wis. 2005) (prohibiting use of eminent domain power for condemnation of nonblighted property if the transfer is to a private
entity).
227
H.B. 2675, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006) (on file with law review), available at http://www.azleg.gov/DocumentsForBill.asp?Bill_Number=HB2675 (requiring clear and convincing evidence of slum conditions on a property by property basis
before eminent domain power can be used and prohibiting takings for economic development).
228
S.B. 1206, 2006 Leg. (Cal. 2006) (on file with law review), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_1201-1250/sb_1206_bill_
20060929_chaptered.pdf (redefining blight and prohibiting inclusion of nonblighted property in eminent domain taking to cure blight); A.B. 1162 (Cal. 2006)
(on file with law review), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0506/bill/asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1162_bill_20050902_amended_sen.pdf (proposing
moratorium on takings of private property for private use until specified date); S.B.
1210, 2006 Leg. (Cal. 2006) (on file with law review), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_1201-1250/sb_1210_bill_
20060929_chaptered.pdf (proposing prohibition on takings of nonblighted private
property for economic development or increased tax revenue); A.C.A. 15 (Cal. 2005)
(on file with law review), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/
bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sca_15_bill_20050823_amended_sen.pdf (proposing constitutional amendment prohibiting redevelopment without a written finding of both
physical and economic blight).
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232

233

234

235

Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
236
237
238
239
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennes229

L.C.O. 24, Gen. Assem., Feb. 2006 Sess. (Conn. 2006) (on file with law review)
(proposing a prohibition on takings for economic development unless part of a
comprehensive redevelopment plan which provides public use, is not for primary
benefit of private party, and is reasonably necessary to accomplish redevelopment);
L.C.O. 34, Gen. Assem., Feb. 2006 Sess. (Conn. 2006) (on file with law review) (proposing specifically enumerated “condemnation-eligible” property).
230
H.B. 4604, 184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2006) (on file with law review), available at
http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/ht04pdf/ht04604.pdf (proposing a prohibition on takings for economic development except to remedy substandard or blighted
housing conditions); HB. 4605, 184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2006) (on file with law review), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/ht04pdf/ht04605.pdf
(proposing a restriction on eminent domain when the sole purpose is economic development).
231
S.J.R. E, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005) (on file with law review), available at
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2005-2006/jointresolutionenrolled/
Senate/pdf/2005-SNJR-E.pdf (proposing prohibition on takings for economic development or tax revenues); H.J.R. N., 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005) (on file
with law review), available at
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/20052006/jointresolutionintroduced/House/pdf/2005-HIJR-N.pdf (proposing a prohibition on takings for the primary benefit of private entities); Act of Sept. 20, 2006,
2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 367 (proposing same); H.B. 5060, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess (Mich.
2006) (on file with law review), available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/
documents/2005-2006/publicact/pdf/2006-PA-0367.pdf (proposing same); S.B. 693,
93rd Leg., Reg. Sess (Mich. 2005) (on file with law review), available at
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2005-2006/publicact/pdf/2006-PA0368.pdf (proposing same).
232
Ballot Init. 154 (Mont. 2006) (decertified from ballot consideration as of Oct.
21, 2006 due to recent court decisions) (on file with law review), available at
http://sos.mt.gov/ELB/archives/2006/I/I-154.asp (proposing a requirement of
clear and convincing evidence that property is a danger to safety and health of the
community on a property-by-property basis before a direct or indirect transfer of private property to a private party).
233
S.B. 156, 212 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2006) (on file with law review), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/S0500/156_I1.PDF (proposing a prohibition on use of eminent domain under redevelopment laws); Assem. B. 3277, 212
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2006) (on file with law review), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A3500/3277_I1.PDF (proposing same); S.B.
211, 212 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2006) (on file with law review), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/S0500/211_I1.PDF (proposing moratorium
on use of eminent domain); Assem. B. 2423, 212 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2006) (on file
with law review), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A2500/2423_I1.PDF (proposing a forty-eight month moratorium on certain uses of eminent domain).
234
Assem. B. 9060 (N.Y. 2005) (on file with law review), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A09060&sh=t (proposing creation of a state
commission to consider eminent domain laws); S.B. 6216 (N.Y. 2006) (on file with
law review) (proposing same); Assem. B. 9043 (N.Y. 2006) (on file with law review),
available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A09043&sh=t (proposing a requirement of a comprehensive development plan for economic development taking,
and requiring municipal approval of such plans); S.B. 5946 (N.Y. 2005) (on file with
law review) (proposing same); Assem. B. 9144 (N.Y. 2005) (on file with law review),
available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A09144&sh=t (proposing that trans-
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all have legislation pending in their respective

fers to private developers be subject to unanimous vote of the local government
board and permissive referendum by the public).
235
H.B. 1854, Gen. Assem., 2005 Sess. (N.C. 2005) (on file with law review), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2005/Bills/House/HTML/H1854v1.
html (proposing a prohibition on eminent domain takings for economic development or increased tax base); S.B. 1222, Gen. Assem., 2005 Sess. (N.C. 2005) (on file
with law review), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2005/Bills/
Senate/HTML/S1222v1.html (proposing same).
236
S.B. 1035, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2006) (on file with law review) (proposing
a prohibition on eminent domain transfers to a private party for the primary purpose
of benefiting that private party); H.B. 2092, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2006) (on file
with law review) (proposing that condemning agency may not sell condemned private property for five years after taking to any person besides original property
owner); S.B. 1408, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2006) (on file with law review) (proposing a prohibition on eminent domain transfers to any private party).
237
H.B. 3505, 73rd Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005) (on file with law review),
available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/05reg/measpdf/hb3500.dir/hb3505.intro.pdf
(proposing a prohibition on takings unless the property is to be owned, maintained,
occupied, and used by the public for public purposes).
238
H.B. 6636, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2005) (on file with law review)
(urging Congress to amend the Constitution to protect private property rights and
nullify Kelo decision); S.B. 1237, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2005) (on file
with law review) (urging same).
239
H.B. 4295, Gen. Assem., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005) (on file with law review), available at http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess116_2005-2006/bills/4295.htm (proposing a
definition of public use to require a “significant and direct” public benefit as opposed to a secondary or incidental benefit while a private party has the primary benefit); S.B. 1029, Gen. Assem., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005) (on file with law review), available
at http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess116_2005-2006/bills/1029.htm (proposing creation of eminent domain study committee to review eminent domain power); S.B.
1030, Gen. Assem., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005) (on file with law review), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess116_2005-2006/bills/1030.htm (proposing deletion of provisions providing for use of eminent domain to clear blighted or slum areas); A. 458, S.B. 1029, Gen. Assem., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2006) (on file with law
review), available at http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess116_2005-2006/bills/1029.htm
(proposing deletion of provisions providing for use of eminent domain to clear
blighted or slum areas).
240
H.B. 2432, 2005 Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 2005) (on file with law review), available at
http://www.legislature.state.tn.us/info/Leg_Archives/104GA/Bills/BillText/HB243
2.pdf (proposing a prohibition on eminent domain takings for economic development or increased tax revenues); S.B. 2421, 2005 Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 2005) (on file
with
law
review),
available
at
http://www.legislature.state.tn.us/info/Leg_Archives/104GA/Bills/BillText/SB242
1.pdf (proposing a prohibition on takings primarily for economic development and
a shift of the burden of proof to the condemning agency).
241
H.B. 1278, 2006 Gen. Assem. (Va. 2006) (on file with law review), available at
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+ful+HB1278 (proposing that “public use” shall not include takings of private property for the primary purpose of tax
revenue enhancement).
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State legislatures, although empowered with the ability to provide greater protection to private landowners, should consider such
alternatives carefully. Rather than restricting the use of eminent domain power, it is likely that many states may just need to give specific
clarification on what can be considered a public use. Due to the Kelo
decision, the baseline for a public use is set low, but that does not
mean that it is non-existent. The most prudent move would be for
states to thoroughly analyze their current eminent domain laws, their
history, and their use, while imposing a moratorium on eminent domain actions to alleviate any public pressures. Through this careful
and reasoned response, the legislatures will be able to act in the best
interest of their constituents without making any rash decisions.
C. Grassroots Campaign
The Institute for Justice, a libertarian group campaigning in fa242
vor of private property rights, spearheaded a $3 million campaign,
entitled “Hands Off My House,” looking to protect citizens and property rights groups in the fight against broad eminent domain
243
Further, the group has drafted model legislation in order
power.
244
to facilitate state government efforts to limit the effect of Kelo. The
Institute for Justice has also represented homeowners who fall victim
245
to government takings through the use of eminent domain.
Statistics have shown that almost ninety percent of Americans
express disapproval of the governmental takings that are permitted
246
by the Supreme Court after Kelo.
In clever protest to Kelo’s embrace of a broad eminent domain power, a group of property rights
activists have petitioned to have Justice Souter’s home condemned
247
The movement is led by a man from Califorfor redevelopment.
nia, Logan Darrow Clements, who seeks to have Souter’s home in
Weare, New Hampshire condemned and turned into a hotel, which
Clements says will bring significantly higher tax revenue to the
248
The movement is clearly motivated to prove how harmful
town.
242

Hands Off Our Homes, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4298759.
243
Juliana Gruenwald, Kelo Decision Unleashes Grass Roots Backlash Against Private
Property Seizures, 74 U.S. LAW WEEK 2067 (Aug. 9, 2005).
244
Id.
245
See, e.g., City of Norwood v. Horney, 161 Ohio App. 3d 316, 2005-Ohio-2448,
830 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
246
Hands Off Our Homes, supra note 242.
247
Nightline: Judging the Judge Activists Turn Tables on Supreme Court Justice (ABC
television broadcast Aug. 26, 2005).
248
Id.
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Souter’s involvement in the Kelo majority will be to private property
owners, with the name of the proposed hotel being the “Lost Liberty
249
Hotel” and a dining room called the “Just Desserts Café.” Although
the plan is not being taken seriously by many, Clements needs only
twenty-five signatures to get the plan on the municipality’s schedule
in March of 2006, “where a simple majority vote would force the town
250
to take a serious look at claiming and rezoning Souter’s property.”
Justice Breyer’s vacation home in New Hampshire is also the target of
251
a similar campaign to seize the property for a new park.
As opposed to these campaigns, one challenge to eminent domain power recently lodged by private property owners that was
taken seriously by the judiciary was a proposed condemnation of non252
blighted private property for economic redevelopment in Ohio.
On July 26, 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court issued an opinion in favor
253
of private property owners. Represented by the Institute for Justice,
the property owners challenged the taking of their property, alleged
to be deteriorating, to clear way for privatized chain stores and office
254
The lower court found that although the property was
buildings.
not blighted, it was considered “deteriorating” because there was diversity of ownership and the property could be more productively
used if it were condemned and redeveloped into upscale apartments
255
The lower court, therefore, allowed for
and commercial property.
256
In deciding the
the taking of the property for the development.
appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Supreme
Court of the United States’ majority opinion in Kelo, instead adopting
the view of the dissenters in that case as the more appropriate legal
257
framework to interpret the Ohio Constitution. The Ohio Supreme
Court, in analyzing its state constitution, held that state courts must
apply heightened scrutiny “when reviewing statutes that regulate the

249

Fox
News,
Land
Grab
or
‘Just
Desserts?’,
Aug.
28,
2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,167137,00.html.
250
Id.
251
Gruenwald, supra note 243, at 2068.
252
See City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853
N.E.2d 1115.
253
See infra notes 257–60 and accompanying text.
254
City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d
1115, at ¶ 105.
255
City of Norwood v. Horney, 161 Ohio App. 3d 316, 2005-Ohio-2448, 830
N.E.2d 381, at ¶ 37.
256
Id. at ¶ 38.
257
City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d
1115, at ¶ 76.
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258

use of eminent-domain powers.”
Further, the court held that “although economic factors may be considered in determining whether
private property may be appropriated, the fact that the appropriation
would provide an economic benefit to the government and community, standing alone, does not satisfy the public-use requirement of
259
Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” Finally, the court
held that the use of the term “deteriorating” in eminent domain legislation was void for vagueness because it “inherently incorporates
speculation as to the future condition of the property to be appropriated rather than the condition of the property at the time of the tak260
ing.”
The Ohio Supreme Court is the first state supreme court to
issue a decision on the breadth of its state eminent domain statute after Kelo, and, in doing so, is likely one of only few state courts to issue
a decision prior to legislative action addressing the issue.
VI.

IS THERE A GENERAL OVERREACTION TO KELO?

The Kelo majority embraces a view of eminent domain power
that is considerably more broad than previous takings jurisprudence.
Although the Supreme Court, prior to Kelo, had put itself on the path
of deference to the legislature and rational basis review, it was always
261
careful not to write a blank check. The majority in Kelo, by allowing
the government to take private land and transfer it to a subsequent
private owner for purposes of generalized economic development,
lost sight of its previous jurisprudence. The Kelo majority discusses
Berman as if it is a congruent analysis, but, in fact, Berman is readily
distinguishable by the overriding goal of the plan, in that case to cure
blight. With a readily identifiable problem or harm being cured, as
opposed to generalized economic benefit to the community, the Supreme Court had adequately restricted governmental takings power.
As Justice O’Connor pointed out in her dissent, the Supreme Court
had previously allowed takings of private property with a subsequent
262
Such a use
private owner to cure a specific harm or evil to society.
of the eminent domain power is consistent with the function of government, and legislatures should be careful in going too far in limiting Kelo, as they may inadvertently constrict an important government
tool. Economic development does not automatically correlate to a
misguided or improper taking, as there may be times when it is justi258
259
260
261
262

Id. at ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
See supra notes 24–68 and accompanying text (discussing Berman and Midkiff).
See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text.
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fied to combat a specific harm to society, such as blighted neighborhoods or slums that require such governmental action.
The Kelo decision, in part due to its own language allowing the
States to provide greater protection to private property rights of its
citizens, has caused a torrent of action at every level of the country to
restrict the effect of the ruling. The list of remedies and tools used by
the federal government, state governments, and citizens of the country is broad and varied, some with a more significant effect than others. Overall, legislation and reaction subsequent to Kelo can be divided into two categories: innocuous and potentially harmful.
A. Innocuous Legislation
Innocuous legislation, both proposed and enacted, in reaction
to the Kelo decision is legislation that does not present a risk of harmful, possibly inadvertent, consequences. Innocuous legislation encompasses those bills proposed in state legislatures that say little more
than “eminent domain may not be used to benefit a particular private
263
party.”
This idea adds nothing new to eminent domain jurisprudence at the federal or state level because this specific private taking/private benefit restriction on eminent domain power has been
articulated by the Supreme Court in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Mid264
265
This legislakiff, and reaffirmed by the majority opinion in Kelo.
tion does nothing to address the problem of allowing the public use
test to be satisfied by broad economic development. The likely purpose of legislation such as this is to provide peace of mind to those
constituents concerned that the government will use its takings power
for an improper purpose or with underhanded motives. Assuming
the government is acting fairly and without deceitful motives, there is
no real risk in passing legislation stating that the government needs
to act in such a manner.
Also on the list of innocuous legislation are bills that ensure a
right of reverter to the party that is the victim of the condemnation
proceedings, regardless of the public use that justified such a taking
266
Such legislation ensures that the party who loses
in the first place.

263

See e.g., supra notes 224, 231, 236.
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (“A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no
legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.”).
265
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661 (“[T]he City would no doubt
be forbidden from taking petitioners’ land for the purpose of conferring a private
benefit on a particular private party.”).
266
See, e.g., ALA CODE § 11-47-170(c) (2005).
264
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his land will have the first right to buy back the land at the price received as just compensation should the property cease being used for
267
It is hard to see when “economic redevelopment”
a public use.
ceases to be a public use, but this reverter may apply under circumstances where there is a more classic public use, such as a park which
no longer functions in that capacity. This legislation is innocuous in
two ways. First, it promotes a level of fairness in the condemnation
process in that the owner who is forced to leave his land without his
consent will have a right or possibility of repossessing the land at no
greater cost if a public use is no longer satisfied. Second, the legislation is likely innocuous because it is hard to see its practical effect.
Those private owners whose property is condemned by the government for economic development are obviously going to use the funds
to relocate and settle into a home or start a new business somewhere
else. In theory, the economic development could be terminated and
the property offered to the private owner at the same price received,
but this could happen many years in the future. Once the property is
actually taken and the economic development begins, it is unlikely
that a property owner will attempt to repurchase the property.
The most prudent course of action for legislators that has an innocuous effect is enforcing an eminent domain moratorium. This
tool is used to stop the use of eminent domain power by state and local government for a determined period of time while the legislature
has a chance to study and consider its current eminent domain laws
268
and any proposed changes or increased restrictions to those laws.
While the moratorium may have the effect of curtailing eminent domain projects currently, it also affords representatives the time and
ability to act with prudence because they are not in a race against the
clock to stop a specific taking or respond to political pressures from
constituents. Instead of a rush to judgment, which could lead to a
remedy that is too broad or has harmful future effects, the moratorium gives the opportunity to consider all the consequences of legislation, thus allowing for a more rational, practical decision. It is likely
that the legislators may not need to completely overhaul their eminent domain legislation, but instead just clarify the requirements of a
267

Id.
The eminent domain moratorium was ordered by the Governor of Connecticut Jodi Rell and has halted the redevelopment plan in New London until the legislature has the opportunity to review Connecticut eminent domain laws. Lisa Knepper
& John Kramer, Grassroots Groundswell Grows Against Eminent Domain Abuse, INST. FOR
JUST, July 12, 2005, available at http://ij.org/private_property/connecticut/
7_12_05pr.html; see also S.B. 1206, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (proposing
moratorium on takings of private property for private use until specified date).
268
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public use. These possible courses of action need to be carefully considered and not the result of rushed reactions to the Kelo decision.
B. Potentially Harmful Legislation and Reaction
In the wake of the Kelo decision, the surge of responses at both
the federal and state level could prove to be excessively restricting,
and thus harmful to eminent domain power, long seen as an essential
power of the government. Also, the significant increase in public attention towards the power of eminent domain and continued support for challenges to eminent domain power could prove restrictive
and harmful to overall government operation.
The most troublesome legislation is that which states “economic
269
development shall not be considered a public purpose.” This legislation is potentially harmful because it utilizes inappropriately broad
language in crafting a remedy that has the capability of excessively restricting a necessary governmental tool. While some proposed state
statutes qualify this language by excepting blighted areas or slums
270
from the purview of the proposed statute, much of the proposed
271
Proposed bills in both the
legislation contains no such condition.
Senate and the House of Representatives state specifically that the
term “public use” shall not be construed to include economic devel272
None of the proposed bills in Congress set forth any ciropment.
cumstances or conditions where economic development would satisfy
273
a public use and therefore be constitutional.
The problem with
such legislation is that it is directly contradictory to sound Supreme
274
Court precedent, and it expressly removes a tool used throughout
history to clean up “miserable and disreputable housing conditions”
which may “suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there
275
Further, this legislation does not contemto the status of cattle.”
plate any potential situations in the future where eminent domain
power may need to be used for economic development to promote a
269

See supra notes 206, 207, 208, 214, 216, 217, 220, 224, 225, 228, 230, 231, 235,

240.
270

See supra notes 206, 208, 214, 216, 217, 220, 225.
See supra notes 207, 224, 228, 230, 231, 235, 240.
272
See supra notes 168–70, 175–76 and accompanying text.
273
See supra notes 168–79 and accompanying text.
274
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that economic redevelopment
plan was a constitutional public use because its purpose was to cure blight in a specified area of the city); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding
that breaking up of land oligopoly creating a more liquid, economic real estate market was constitutional).
275
Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
271
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necessary project or cure a particular harm to society.
It is a dangerous path to take for legislators to restrict a key governmental tool
with such broad language.
This criticism is the same for proposed legislation that specifically enumerates what could constitute a public use for the purposes
of eminent domain. Even the strong dissents in Kelo state that eminent domain power satisfies a public use if the “targeted property in277
This restrictive legislation, at
flicted affirmative harm on society.”
both the federal and state level, which specifically removes economic
development from the definition of public use, may prevent the government from utilizing an important tool to correct potentially harmful situations.
278
The federal act signed into law in late November 2005 also has
problems with ambiguity. Specifically, the bill states that “in this Act,
the term ‘public use’ shall not be construed to include economic de279
The lanvelopment for the primary benefit of a private party.”
guage used by Congress remains vague when trying to figure out who
receives the “primary benefit.” Cleaning up slums using eminent
280
domain has been an accepted function of the power, but, under
such circumstances, more often than not the developer would be receiving more of a benefit than each individual property owner. On
the other hand, however, the entire redevelopment as a whole when
compared to the benefit received by the redeveloper may shift the
balance. Further, monetary benefit cannot be considered the sole
benchmark to determine “benefit,” as other intangibles, such as
comprehensiveness of the plan and increased productivity of the redeveloped neighborhood, must be taken into account. Due to the
unsettled nature of the effects of both the Kelo decision itself and the
response legislation, the future remains uncertain.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Kelo is a decision that has been widely criticized for its broad view
281
of the definition of public use and the takings power. The decision

276

This could include damage brought on by a natural disaster, say, for example,
devastation from a hurricane.
277
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2674 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
278
See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text.
279
Act of Nov. 30, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 2396 (2005); see supra note 162.
280
See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text.
281
See supra Part IV.-V.
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has sparked a great reaction by federal and state legislatures to limit
282
the impact of that holding. This reaction to Kelo, in fact, may result
in significant constraints on the power of government to take private
283
land for any economic development. It is important to realize that
in the wake of such a widely criticized decision, in the rush to cure
the defect, something may be missed or a consequence may go unno284
Imposing a moratorium on eminent domain power for ecoticed.
nomic development while the legislature can carefully consider its
options is a prudent course of action that can ensure thoughtful and
rational reaction to the decision. Broad sweeping remedies, such as a
blanket restriction on economic development satisfying a public use,
go too far. Economic development still has a place as a public use in
certain circumstances when it is aimed at curing a specifically identifiable harm to society. Admittedly, Alabama and Texas, which have
acted through a special session of the legislature to pass legislation
285
have both
limiting the eminent domain power within the state,
drafted legislation that does not, on its face, sweep too broadly. Even
so, it remains to be seen whether the state courts, where these litigation battles increasingly will be fought, will construe this legislation to
prohibit all such economic development takings, thereby significantly
restricting even broadly acceptable eminent domain power.

282
283
284
285

See supra Part V.
See supra Part VI.
See supra Part VI.B.
See supra notes 189–202 and accompanying text.

